It should be noted that as long as the axiomatic representation is accurate and supports mathematical thinking, it does not need to be formal. If this is accepted as a necessary condition for mathematical status, does it exclude operational accounts? At first glance, it seems so. Apparently, programs are reduced to canonical constants without axiomatic definitions. But Turner (2009b, 2010) argues that this is in the wrong place for axiomatization: the latter does not lie in the interpretative constants, but in the rules of evaluation, that is, in the theory of the reduction given by the axiomatic relation (Downarrow). While one school of thought clings to the spiritual power to find meaning in life, the other school of thought opposes it, noting that there is no comprehensible purpose or belief. While concepts and theories differ considerably from the absurdity associated with freedom, the ability to attain a freedom that goes completely beyond what is permitted by the existence of absurdity is not exploratory. The individual`s ability to be aware of the absurd and his reaction to it allows individuals to attain a greater degree of their freedom. The construction of the meaning of life and the purpose of life, when assumed by the absurd, finds a temporary personal nature through projects of construction of meaning. What is the content of the assertion that programs are mathematical objects? In the legal literature, the debate seems to focus on the idea that programs are symbolic objects that can be formally manipulated (Groklaw 2012a, 2012b – see Other Internet Resources). In fact, there is a branch of theoretical computer science called formal theory of language, which treats grammars as objects of mathematical study (Hopcroft & Ullman 1969). While this adds substance to the claim, it is not the most important meaning in which the programs are mathematical. This concerns their semantics, in which programming languages are understood as axiomatic theories (§4.2).
This perspective situates programs as elements in a theory of computation (Turner 2007, 2010). Computer ethics has become a discipline in its own right, distinct from both applied ethics and the philosophy of computer science. This section analyzes two topics of computer ethics, as the philosophy of computer science offers a slightly different perspective on them. In particular, the ontology of software systems influences the debate over property rights over programs, and software development methodology helps clarify and differentiate the moral responsibility of developers. So-called “agile” methods in software development use large-scale software testing to assess the reliability of the computer artifacts implemented. Testing is the most “empirical” process of launching a program and observing its executions to assess whether or not they meet the delivered property specifications. Philosophically minded philosophers and computer scientists have analyzed software testing techniques in light of traditional methodological approaches in scientific discovery (Snelting 1998; Gagliardi, 2007; Northover et al. 2008; Angius 2014) and asked whether software testing can be recognized as scientific experiments to assess program accuracy (Schiaffonati & Verdicchio 2014; Schiaffonati 2015; Tedre, 2015). Many philosophers and computer scientists share the intuition that software has a dual nature (Moor 1978; Colburn, 2000). It seems that the software is both an algorithm, a set of instructions and a concrete object or physical causal process. (Irmak 2012: 3) From the point of view of duality, computer science is not an abstract mathematical discipline independent of the physical world.
To be used, these things must have a physical substance. And once this observation is made, there is a clear link to a central concept in the philosophy of technology (Kroes 2010; Franssen et al. 2010), on which we now turn. The abstraction of computer science takes many different forms. We will not try to describe them systematically here. However, Goguen (Goguen & Burstall 1985) describes some of these varieties, of which the following examples are examples. But what is the logical function of the expressions of these languages? At first glance, these are just expressions in formal language. However, when the underlying ontology is made explicit, each of these languages turns out to be a formal ontology, which can of course be called type theory (Turner 2009a).
According to this interpretation, these expressions are definitions of identification (Gupta 2012). As such, each defines a new abstract object in the formal ontology of its system. One of the first philosophical debates in computer science revolved around the nature of program accuracy. The overall dispute was triggered by two documents (De Millo et al., 1979; Fetzer 1988) and was continued in the GAC discussion forum (e.g. Ashenhurst, 1989; Technical correspondence 1989). The crucial question arises of the duality of the programmes and what exactly one claims to be right in relation to what. Presumably, if a program is considered a mathematical thing, then it has only mathematical properties. But seen as a technical artifact, it has physics. In his essay The Absurd, Thomas Nagel analyzed the eternal absurdity of human life.
The absurdity in life becomes evident when we realize that we take our lives seriously, while realizing that there is a certain arbitrariness in everything we do. He suggests never stopping looking for the absurd. Moreover, he suggests looking for irony in absurdity. [Citation needed] Not only is there no metaphysical difference between the whole-theoretical and the operational, but the latter is also considered the latter.