Dicey`s first rule of law principle was as follows: “No human being is punishable by law or can legally suffer from body or property unless it is a manifest violation of the law that has been established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense, the rule of law must be opposed to any system of government based on the exercise by individuals of extensive, arbitrary or discretionary coercive powers. Very few lawyers have ever established constitutional teachings that not only become classic, but remain alive as norms. A year after the publication of Albert Venn Dicey`s Constitution Act in 1885, Gladstone read it aloud in parliament, citing it as an authority. Half a century later, these teachings were considered so essential and fundamental that a special inquiry was needed to determine whether recent constitutional changes violated them. The Donoughmore Committee, whose report of the Committee on Ministers` Powers appeared in 1932, approved these principles as guidelines for the continuation of the practice. Today, nearly a century later, Britain is by and large still on the Dicey standard, as is the United States. The teachings and even the names by which they are designated are always part of the equipment of the student of public law. Dicey`s analysis of legislative power and constitutional conventions has yet to be taken into account by anyone who wants to deal with the fundamental principles of Anglo-American constitutional law, simply because Dicey analyzed those foundations and formulated principles, with a power never before or since attained and a clarity that makes those foundations understandable. A “health warning” is in order for anyone venturing into this field: a quick glance at the index of legal journals has yielded 16,810 citations on books and articles dealing with the rule of law, and this is certainly an underestimate, as many articles discuss the concept in a way that does not necessarily need to be picked up by the search engine, and the number covers only legal material.
Dicey`s considerable practice at the bar and his position as an advisor to the tax commissioners contributed not only to his election to the Vinerian Chair, but also to his writings, The PrivyCouncil (1861), his treatise on the rules for the selection of parties to a trial (1870), and The Law of Domicil as a branch of English law (1879), he had earned him a considerable reputation as a legal writer. In 1896 he published his Digest of the Lazo of England with Reference to the Confucit of Laws, which was an extension of the law of domicil and is the most famous of his strictly legal works. Conflict of laws law, which is regularly updated, is still standard work today. In the words of his Vinerian successor William Geldart, this work “has not only been reduced to one of the most complicated and technical branches of law. but also exerted a strong influence on its development.” It is also important to recognize, as Raz points out, that the rule of law in the sense above is only a virtue of a legal system and may have to be sacrificed to achieve other desired goals. We may think that the virtues of the rule of law to have clear and general laws should be sacrificed when the best or only way to achieve a desired objective is to have more discretionary and openly structured legislation. This may be the case where it is not possible to establish clear rules in advance in the enabling rules that are sufficiently detailed to cover all eventualities. Changes to the rule of law in this way are in no way prohibited or prohibited.
Since it is only a virtue of a legal system, it should not prevent the realization of other virtues valued by that system. One of the reasons why there are fewer claims for women`s rights [in the United States] is the existence of a much smaller number of women`s defaults than ours, for example in many states, they have the right to own property when married than their own, and have full legal protection for their income. It is impossible not to conclude that the average education of women compared to that of men is higher than in Europe – hence a freer opening of careers. In the United States, women enjoy political privileges. Usually reserved for men. However, it is clear that Lord Bingham believes that the rule of law goes beyond these fundamental rules. It considers that this is the central idea that the laws of the country should apply equally to all, except to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation and that it requires that the law ensure adequate protection of fundamental rights. Lord Bingham expressly opposes Raz`s objection to the inclusion of fundamental rights in the category of the rule of law, but contradicts it in the following words. [191] Dicey was clearly a strong advocate of women`s suffrage. In any case, the political question of women`s suffrage is controversial. But it is not trivial to read the reflections of a respected constitutionalist on the effects of social and political movements on constitutional principles and on individual rights in the constitution.
Dicey says that “constitutional law, as the term is used in England, seems to encompass all rules that directly or indirectly affect the distribution or exercise of sovereign power of the state.” These “rules” can be divided into two broad categories. The first category of rules are laws, strictly understood. These laws are written and unwritten, legal and common, usually called common law. These laws are known and recognized as laws because, as the important determining factor, they are enforced by the courts. The other broad category of rules is what Dicey calls the “conventions of the Constitution.” The rules of this second category are not in strict laws, they are not enforced or enforceable by the courts; but they are the usual and common practice of politicians and officials and represent what Dicey calls “political morality” or “constitutional.” The law of the Constitution therefore consists of two parts: relatively clear laws, derived from judicial decisions and parliamentary decrees and precisely expressed and recognized by the courts, and relatively ambiguous conventions, largely implicit, which are part of political practice and morality and enter into public opinion.